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FLORES v. STATE: YOU'RE NOT GUILTY IN
OKLAHOMA UNTIL YOU'RE PRESUMED
INNOCENT
I. INTRODUCTION
On October 11, 1992, Jose Flores brutally raped and strangled
Sheila Ann Brown.' In a jury trial before the Honorable Clifford E.
Hopper, Thlsa County District Judge, Flores was convicted of First
Degree Murder.2 As part of the jury charge, Judge Hopper instructed
the jury:
[T]hat the defendant is presumed to be not guilty of the crime
charged against him in the Information unless his guilt is established
by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt and that presumption of
being not guilty continues with the defendant unless every material
allegation of the Information is proven by evidence beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.3
In Flores v. State4 (hereinafter Flores I), the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals unanimously reversed the judgment and sentence of
Jose Flores for the crime of Murder in the First Degree because the
trial court erroneously instructed the jury.5 Writing for the majority,
Judge Strubhar noted that the erroneous instructions resulted in a de-
nial of Flores' statutory and constitutional rights.6 The court held that
the error was not harmless because the instruction constituted a sub-
stantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.' In a concur-
ring opinion, Judge Lumpkin agreed that the case must be reversed,
1. Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162, 1168 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (Strubhar, J., specially
concurring).
2. Jose Flores was tried in Case No. CF-92-4472 in the District Court of Tulsa County.
Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558, 559 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3379 (U.S.
Nov. 27, 1995) (No. 95-493).
3. Id. at 560.
4. 896 P.2d 558 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cert denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3379 (U.S. Nov. 27,
1995) (No. 95493).
5. Id. at 559.
6. Id. According to the court, the interests of an accused which are protected in a criminal
action by a presumed innocent instruction are not sufficiently safeguarded when a presumed not
guilty instruction is given. Id. at 562.
7. Id. at 560. See infra note 91 for a discussion of the harmless error doctrine.
The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure define harmless error in the following manner.
"[a]ny error, defect, irregularity or variance which does not affect substantial rights shall be
disregarded." FED. R. CRim. P. 52.
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but wrote separately to "delineate the factors" considered in the deci-
sion to reverse and remand.8 He argued that the instruction was
solely a statutory violation and the proper standard of review should
be "whether we have 'grave doubts' the error in instructing the jury
did not have a 'substantial influence' on the outcome of the trial." 9
By this decision, the court effectively established a new rule re-
quiring that the language "presumed innocent" be used in jury in-
structions in all Oklahoma criminal trials.10 Where this rule is
violated, the Court of Criminal Appeals will find reversible error.1
This new rule, however, was apparently not intended by all members
of the court, even though the Mores I decision was unanimous.'2 In
fact, the court has become deeply divided over this rule, as evidenced
by the four separate opinions accompanying the denial of the State's
Petition for Rehearing in Flores v. State,'3 (hereinafter Flores H1). The
disagreement within the court relates to the application of the harm-
less error doctrine to these types of cases, and has even led Judge
Lumpkin to urge the court to withdraw the opinion and rewrite it
more clearly.
14
This note will first summarize the facts of Flores L It will then
briefly examine both the majority opinion and Judge Lumpkin's con-
curring opinion as well as the opinions contained in the denial of the
State's Petition for Rehearing in Flores IL This note will show that
Mores I failed to clearly establish whether its decision rested on rights
8. Flores, 896 P.2d at 563 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
9. Id. (citing Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)).
10. Although the Flores I court does not expressly hold that any such instruction is revers-
ible error, it is plain from subsequent cases that this is the new rule. See e.g. Price v. State, No. F-
92-307, summ. op. at 2, Not For Publication (Okla. Crim. App. filed Feb. 14, 1995) and Price v.
State, No. F-92-344, summ. op. at 2, Not For Publication (Okla. Crim. App. filed Feb 14, 1995).
In both Price cases, the court determined that the judgment and sentence must be reversed
and remanded for a new trial. Price No. F-92-307 at 2; Price No. F-92-344 at 2. The court cited
Flores for the proposition that faulty jury instructions constitute reversible error. Price No. F-92-
307 at 2; Price No. F-92-344 at 2. Unlike Flores , however, these cases held that the absence of
instructions informing the jury on the presumption of innocence and proper burden of proof
deprived appellant of a "constitutionally fair trial." Price No. F-92-307 at 2 (emphasis added);
Price No. F-92-344 at 2 (emphasis added). For this reason, the court concluded that a harmless
error analysis was not possible and the error required reversal and remand for a new trial. Price
No. F-92-307 at 2; Price No. F-92-344 at 2.
11. See Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). Since the initial Flores
decision, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has overturned 38 Ilbsa County criminal
verdicts, at least partially due to "not guilty" jury instructions. See Instruction Voids Sex Case
Verdicts, TULSA WORLD, Nov. 10, 1995, at Newsl5.
12. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1170 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
13. 899 P.2d 1162 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995). See infra notes 74-86 and accompanying text for
a summary of the separate opinions.
14. See Fores, 899 P.2d at 1177 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 31:349
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guaranteed by Oklahoma statute or the United States Constitution.
In fact, it will be shown that the court did not apply a clear and unam-
biguous test for determining whether faulty jury instructions are sus-
ceptible to harmless error analysis, and if they are, how this analysis is
to be applied. This note will demonstrate that, examined separately,
neither the statute nor the United States Constitution demand the de-
cision reached by the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals.'" Fi-
nally, this note will conclude that the Flores I rule that "presumed not
guilty" jury instructions constitute reversible error, while well inten-
tioned, was not necessary and "presumed not guilty" instructions
should be examined on a case by case basis for harmful or reversible
error.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 12, 1992, the corpse of thirty-year old Sheila Ann
Brown was found wrapped in a trash bag and bound with wire in a
Tulsa County trash dumpster.16 Her mouth was stuffed with men's
underwear.17 Although she was wearing a sweatshirt and jeans, a por-
tion of the crotch of her jeans and panties had been cut out and placed
in a jean pocket.'8 Besides numerous bruises, considerable injury had
been inflicted on her neck and anus.' 9 The cause of death was deter-
mined to be asphyxiation by strangulation.20
Between 10:30 and 11:00 p.m. on the night before discovery of the
body, a man was seen carrying what appeared to be a large black trash
bag on his shoulder in the proximity of the trash dumpster.21 A wit-
ness testified that the man seemed to be having a hard time balancing
the bag and had to adjust it on his shoulder.22 As he neared the
dumpster, the man disappeared from the view of the witness, but
reappeared a short time later walking down the alley away from the
dumpster.23
15. See discussion infra part V.
16. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 2, Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995) (No. F-93-977), cerL denied, 64 U.S.L.W. 3379 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1995) (No. 95-493).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. State's Petition for Rehearing at 4, Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995) (No. F-93-977).
20. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 2.
21. Id. at 2-3.
22. Id. at 2.
23. Id. Although the witness, John Conley, could only identify the person he saw as a non-
black male at the time of the investigation, Flores later admitted that he had disposed of the
body. See id. at 2-3; State's Petition for Rehearing at 4.
1995]
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Mr. Flores lived in an apartment facing the alley where the dump-
ster was located and, while the police were canvassing the area during
the investigation, a detective struck up a conversation with him.24 Mr.
Flores gave the detective a false name, but the false name was very
similar to the name on an outstanding misdemeanor warrant and, af-
ter further investigation, Mr. Flores was arrested on that warrant.2 5
Mr. Flores waived his Miranda rights and agreed to talk with
Detective Fred Parke.26 Although he originally told the detective that
he had no knowledge of the incident, Mr. Flores later changed his
story.2 7 Mr. Flores subsequently identified a picture of the decedent
as a woman he and a man named "Scott" had picked up at a conven-
ience store.28 Immediately after picking her up, they all went back to
Mr. Flores' apartment.29
According to Mr. Flores, he and the decedent went to his apart-
ment with "Scott. '30  Mr. Flores admitted having sex with the dece-
dent, but claimed that he then returned to the front room and "Scott"
went back to the bedroom with the decedent; then "Scott" abruptly
left.3 ' Mr. Flores claimed that he remained in the front room drinking
beer until the morning, when he discovered the dead body of Miss
Brown.32 He subsequently wrapped her up and disposed of her body
in the trash dumpster.33
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. Flores gave his name as Michael Torres during the initial conversation with detec-
tives. Id. Pursuant to a records check, the police discovered an outstanding misdemeanor war-
rant for a Miquel Torres. Id. Flores was arrested two days later on the misdemeanor warrant
because the police believed Flores and Torres to be the same person. Id. Flores apparently also
used, at various times, the names Miguel Torres, Jose Angel Almanza Perez, and Carlos Rivera.
See Appellee's Brief on Direct Appeal at 2-5.
26. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 3-4.
27. State's Petition for Rehearing at 4.
28. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 4. The identity or even the existence of the man
named "Scott" has not been determined. See id.; State's Petition for Rehearing at 4.
The circumstances surrounding the pick-up of the victim, however, were determined at the
trial. Flores, Denny Childress, and Danny Alvarez were riding around with Glen Leroy Trum-
bull, and they stopped at a convenience store. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 4. The
victim approached Flores and asked for a cigarette, whereupon Flores asked Glen for a ride to
his apartment for himself and the victim. Id.
29. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 4-5. After arriving at the apartment, Mr. Flores
asked Glen Trumbull to wait while they went inside because the victim would need another ride
to get some drugs. Id. Childress, Alvarez, and Trumbull waited outside for about thirty minutes
at which time they knocked on the apartment door several times. Id. Receiving no response,
they eventually left without seeing either Mr. Flores or the victim again. Id.
30. State's Petition for Rehearing at 4.
31. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 4.
32. Id.
33. State's Petition for Rehearing at 4.
4
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The police were able to collect samples of blood from a mattress
in Mr. Flores' apartment, and at least one of the samples had genetic
markers consistent with the decedent. 4 Vaginal and oral smears from
the decedent indicated the presence of sperm, and the smears had ge-
netic markers consistent with that of both Mr. Flores and the
decedent.35
The defense did not present any evidence at the conclusion of the
State's case,36 relying instead on requested intoxication instructions.37
At the conclusion of the evidence, the District Judge instructed the
jury.38 For purposes of the Flores decision, two instructions are rele-
vant.39 The first of these is the now infamous "not guilty" instruc-
tion.40 The second instruction read:
You are instructed that the burden of proof in this case is upon the
State to establish by evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the
material allegations contained in the Information and unless the
State has met it's [sic] duty in this respect, you cannot find the de-
fendant guilty, but must acquit him.:
It should be noted that, at the time these instructions were ad-
ministered, Flores failed to object or to submit any written instruc-
tions to correct the errors.42 The jury convicted Jose Flores of First
Degree Murder and recommended punishment of life without pa-
role.43 The trial court sentenced Flores accordingly.44
34. Appellant's Brief on Direct Appeal at 5.
35. lId
36. Id.
37. See id. at 6-7. The defendant proposed instructions which would have negated the re-
quired volition for premeditated murder by reason of intoxication. Id.
38. Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558, 559 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W.
3379 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1995) (No. 95-493).
39. Although the Appellant raised seven propositions of error, only two were addressed by
the court in its decision. Id. Appellant's fourth proposition of error was "that the trial court
committed reversible error in administering a modified version of Oklahoma Uniform Jury In-
struction-Criminal No. 903." Id. at 559-60. Appellant's third proposition of error was "that the
trial court committed reversible error in administering a modified version of OUJI-CR-109." Id.
at 562.
40. See supra text accompanying note 3.
41. Flores, 896 P.2d at 562-63 (citing Instruction No. 1 in Orig. Rec. at 44).
42. Id. at 560.
43. Id. at 559. Flores was convicted of violating OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.7(A) (1991),
which states:
A person commits murder in the first degree when he unlawfully and with malice afore-
thought causes the death of another human being. Malice is that deliberate intention
unlawfully to take away the life of a human being, which is manifested by external
circumstances capable of proof.
44. Flores, 896 P.2d at 559.
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III. F oREs I
A. The Majority Opinion
In Flores I, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
the judgment and sentence of the trial court and remanded for a new
trial.45 The court held that the trial judge "erroneously instructed the
jury resulting in a denial of Appellant's constitutional and statutory
rights."4 6 In its analysis, the court noted that failure to give proper
Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions (OUJI) only requires reversal
where the error "results in a miscarriage of justice" or substantially
violates a constitutional or statutory right.47 However, Judge
Strubhar, writing for the majority, explained that the presumption of
innocence until proven guilty is a right guaranteed by statute and is
thus entitled to greater protection than typical for jury instructions.48
In addition, the court suggested by its discussion that the United
States Constitution's due process guarantee that guilt is to be proved
by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt is likewise implicated.4 9 Ac-
cording to the court, the presumed not guilty instruction "obfuscates
the presumption of innocence" by diluting the principle that guilt is to
be established by evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, and therefore
requires reversal.
50
The trial court administered a modified version of Criminal In-
struction Number 903.51 By statute, trial courts in Oklahoma are re-
quired to administer the uniform instructions where they accurately
set forth the law.5z The Court of Criminal Appeals determined that
45. Id.
46. 1I
47. Id. at 560 (citing Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 85 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (quoting
Brown v. State, 777 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 3001.1
(1991)))). See infra note 59 for text of statute.
48. Mores, 896 P.2d at 560 (citing Miller v. State, 106 P. 538 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910) and
OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 836 (1991)).
49. Id. at 561-62. See infra notes 104-29 and accompanying text.
50. See id. at 562 (relying on Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 485 (1978) (quoting 9 J.
WmMoRE, EvrDiEN E § 2511 at 407 (3d ed. 1940)) and Miller, 106 P. at 539).
51. Id at 559-60. OUJI-CR-903 provides:
The defendant(s) [is] [are] presumed innocent of the crime(s) charged, and the pre-
sumption continues unless, after consideration of all the evidence, you are convinced of
[his] [her] [their] guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The State has the burden of present-
ing the evidence that establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The defendant(s)
must be found not guilty unless the State produces evidence which convinces you be-
yond a reasonable doubt of each element of the crime.
Cf. supra text accompanying note 3.
52. Id. at 560. OKuA. STAT. tit. 12, § 577.2 (1991) provides in pertinent part:
Whenever Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instructions (OUJI) contains an instruction appli-
cable in a civil case or a criminal case, giving due consideration to the facts and the
[Vol. 31:349
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the Oklahoma Uniform Jury Instruction correctly set forth the pre-
sumption of innocence and was therefore an accurate restatement of
the law. 3 Thus, by failing to correctly administer Instruction Number
903, the trial court violated the mandate of the Oklahoma statute.5 4
Even so, the court correctly noted that mere deviation from
OUfl does not require automatic reversal of the verdict.55 This is es-
pecially true where, as here, the defendant failed to object to the given
instructions or submit alternative instructions.56 In such a situation,
the court's review is limited to fundamental or plain error.57
Nevertheless, just as mere deviation from OUI does not require
automatic reversal, neither does the discovery of plain error by the
court.5 8 In fact, reversal is only mandated where the error is so egre-
gious that it results in a miscarriage of justice or substantially violates
either a constitutional or statutory right.59 Even where there is plain
prevailing law, and the court determines that the jury should be instructed on the sub-
ject, the OUJI instructions shall be used unless the court determines that it does not
accurately state the law.
See also Fontenot v. State, 881 P.2d 69, 84 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) (stating the rule that a
relevant uniform instruction "shall be used unless the [trial] court determines that it does not
accurately state the law").
53. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560.
54. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 577.2 (1991).
55. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560 (citing Fontenot, 881 P.2d at 84).
56. Normally in such a situation, any error is waived. See Rowell v. State, 699 P.2d 651, 653
(Okla. Crim. App. 1985) (holding that where the appellant has failed to object, failed to submit
correcting instructions, and failed to include such proposition in its motion for a new trial, appel-
late review is waived for all but fundamental error).
57. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560. See also Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 694 (Okla. Crim. App.
1994) (quoting Jones v. State, 772 P.2d 922, 925 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (stating that plain
errors are "errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the attention of
the court")). Fundamental errors are errors "which go to the foundation of the case, or which
take from a defendant a right which was essential to his defense." Id. at 695 (citing Rea v. State,
105 P. 386 (Okla. Crim. App. 1909)). In addition, the error must be material, which means "of
solid or weighty character, of consequence; ... constituting a matter that is entitled to considera-
tion, such as must be considered in deciding a case on its merits." Id. (quoting Thompson v.
State, 117 P. 216 (Okla. Crim. App. 1911)). This concept of review of fundamental error has
been codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2104 (1991).
The proper test in reviewing for fundamental error is whether as a whole, the instructions
fairly state the applicable law. Maghe v. State, 620 P.2d 433,437 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) (citing
Cantrell v. State, 562 P.2d 527 (Okla. Crim. App. 1977)).
58. Simpson, 876 P.2d at 693.
59. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560 (citing Fontenot, 881 P.2d at 85 (quoting Brown v. State, 777 P.2d
1355, 1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1989) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 3001.1 (1991)))). OKLA. STAT.
tit. 20, § 3001.1 reads:
No judgment shall be set aside or new trial granted by any appellate court of this state
in any case, civil or criminal, on the ground of misdirection of the jury or for error in
any matter of pleading or procedure, unless it is the opinion of the reviewing court that
the error complained of has probably resulted in a miscarriage of justice, or constitutes
a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory right.
1995]
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error, the court must endeavor to determine whether such error was
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
60
Despite these limitations on the court's appellate review, the Flo-
res I court found that the presumed not guilty jury instruction diluted
the burden of proof required by statute and was therefore harmful.61
As a result, the court found that the failure to give the required jury
instruction amounted to a substantial violation of a statutory right and
thus constituted reversible error.62 It is not clear, however, how the
court reached this decision since the opinion did not specifically state
the factors it employed in determining what constitutes a substantial
violation.63 In fact, the court did not even deem it necessary to recite
the facts of the case, which further complicates efforts to understand
the basis of the decisionfr4
B. The Concurring Opinion
Although Judge Lumpkin concurred with the majority of the
court that the case must be reversed, he wrote separately to set forth
the factors used to determine that reversal was necessary. 65 He stated
that the decision was solely based on violation of a statutory right.66
For this reason, he felt that the correct standard of review should be
"whether we have 'grave doubts' the error in instructing the jury did
not have a 'substantial influence' on the outcome of the trial" instead
of whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.67
60. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560. See infra note 91 for a discussion of the harmless error doctrine.
See also Simpson, 876 P.2d at 693 (noting that plain error is to be reviewed in order to determine
whether it requires reversal or whether it was harmless).
61. Flores, 896 P.2d at 562 (noting the "most likely outcome" of changes in Uniform Jury
Instructions to be "unnecessary confusion and a constitutionally impermissible lessening of the
required standard of proof").
62. Id.
63. Rather than showing what happened in the Flores trial to warrant reversal, the court
reversed in order to protect the principle that guilt be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id.
The court stated that a not guilty instruction "amounts to an impermissible lessening of the
burden of proof by expanding the degree of doubt that is permissible." Id. In order to safeguard
this principle, the court felt that any instruction of "not guilty" must be reversed. Id. See also
Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
64. Flores, 896 P.2d at 559. Oddly, the Court of Criminal Appeals felt that a recitation of
the facts was unnecessary since they reversed and remanded the case for a new trial. See id.
65. Id. at 563 (Lumpkin; J., concurring in result).
66. Id. ("As the Court correctly states, the presumption of innocence is 'not articulated in
the Constitution' and the decision in this case is based on a violation of a 'right guaranteed by
statute, [OKLA. STAT. tit. 22, § 836 (1991)]"'). Id.
67. Id. at 563 (citing Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)).
[Vol. 31:349
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In arriving at his decision that reversal was warranted, Judge
Lumpkin suggested using the factors set out in Kentucky v. Whorton68
to determine whether failure to give a requested instruction on the
presumption of innocence violates the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. 69 As defined by the United States Supreme
Court, a failure to properly instruct the jury is to be considered under
the totality of the circumstances, which includes such considerations
as other instructions given, the arguments made by counsel, and the
weight of the evidence.70
Like the majority of the court, Judge Lumpkin felt that the jury
instructions did not contain an appropriate burden of proof instruc-
tion, and the erroneous instruction was therefore "not cured."'" In
addition, he noted that the prosecutor made some inappropriate com-
ments and that the evidence of guilt, while sufficient, was not over-
whelming.72 For these reasons, he felt the erroneous instruction
expanded the degree of doubt required for conviction, which thereby
impermissibly lessened the burden of proof required of the prosecu-
tion, and thus reversal was warranted.73
IV. FLORES I
The court had the opportunity to reexamine and clarify its Flores
I decision when the State of Oklahoma filed a Petition for Rehear-
ing.74 Unfortunately, the court denied this petition because it did not
meet the minimum requirements of the Rules of the Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals.7' Nevertheless, in an unusual occurrence, four separate
68. 441 U.S. 786 (1979).
69. Flores, 896 P.2d at 563-64 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
70. Whorton, 441 U.S. at 789. Prior to Flores I, the Court of Criminal Appeals had em-
ployed this standard in order to determine if the failure to give an instruction on the presump-
tion of innocence constituted harmless error. See Hyatt v. State, 779 P.2d 993, 995 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1989).
71. Flores, 896 P.2d at 564 (Lumpkin, J., concurring in result).
72. ld.
73. Id. "I am not certain 'the error did not influence the jury, or had a very slight effect' on
the verdict." Id. (quoting Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690, 702 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994)).
74. Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162, 1163 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995).
75. Id.
A petition for rehearing may only be filed if 1) some question decisive of the case...
has been overlooked by the Court, or 2) the decision is in conflict with an express
statute or controlling decision to which the attention of this Court was not called either
in the brief or in oral argument.
Id. (citing OKLA. CT. CiuM. App. R. 3.14(B)).
1995]
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opinions from members of the court accompanied the one-paragraph
denial of the Petition for Rehearing.76
In his opinion supporting the denial of the petition, Judge Chapel
noted that the proper "harmless error standard applicable to statutory
errors is whether or not the error 'constitutes a substantial violation of
a ... statutory right.' 77  He felt that the original decision clearly
stated that the harmless error doctrine had been applied to the pre-
sumed not guilty instruction and that the court held this error to not
be harmless.78
Likewise, Judge Strubhar felt the initial decision was clear, but
thought the instruction was akin to a structural error and therefore
not subject to harmless error review.79 In her opinion, concluding that
such an error could be harmless "arises from a specious denial of the
role of the Due Process Clause in protecting the invaluable guarantee
afforded by the presumption of innocence."80
Presiding Judge Johnson, on the other hand, apologized for his
concurrence in Flores L81 Although he agreed with the decision as it
related to Mr. Flores, he misunderstood the opinion to mean that the
court was applying the harmless error doctrine in arriving at its con-
clusion.82 In his opinion, the harmless error doctrine should be used
in these cases "to see whether or not the cases could be affirmed by
using such doctrine.
'83
Like Judge Johnson, Judge Lumpkin recognized that the court
did not subject the presumed not guilty instruction to "an application
of harmless error" because the majority felt the error "violate[d] a
substantial statutory right."s He was particularly concerned about
76. See Id. at 1162.
77. Id. at 1164 (Chapel, V.P.J., specially concurring) (citing OKLA. STAT. tit. 20, § 3001.1
(1991)).
78. Id. at 1163.
79. Id. at 1168 (Strubhar, J., specially concurring) (citing Sullivan v. Louisiana, 113 S. Ct.
2078, 2082-83 (1993)).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1169 (Johnson, P.J., dissenting).
82. Id.
My initial reading of the opinion and my reason for the concurrence was my position
that although there was error, which is clear and unambiguous, I would have applied a
harmless error test but in Flores, I did not find harmless error and, therefore, voted to
concur. Now I find that the majority would reverse all Flores type cases due to the fact
that it is a substantial violation of a statutory right and the harmless error doctrine
would not apply. Therefore, I dissent.
Id. at 1169-70.
83. Id. at 1170.
84. Id. at 1170 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting). See also id. at 1163 (Chapel, J., specially concur-
ring) (stating "[T]his court applies the 'harmless error' doctrine to errors which neither result in
[Vol. 31:349
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the court's failure to provide adequate "criteria for determining when
a statutory violation is 'substantial'. '8 5 He maintained that the Legis-
lature intended for the appellate court to apply the harmless error
doctrine in order to prevent "reversal on an error which could not
possibly have affected the outcome" of the trial.
8 6
V. ANALYSIS
Although the jury instructions at issue in Flores differed from
those prescribed by OUJI, they would only violate Oklahoma statu-
tory law if the instructions, taken in their entirety, did not fairly and
accurately state the applicable law.s7 The test for determining
whether instructions fairly and accurately state the applicable law is to
review all the instructions in their entirety.88 Unfortunately, the Flo-
res court failed to do this;89 rather, the court found that the instruction
on "presumed to be not guilty" constituted plain error and could
therefore be reviewed.90
a miscarriage of justice nor constitute a substantial violation of a constitutional or statutory
right").
85. Id. at 1170 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 1170-71. See supra note 59 for text of statute.
87. Flores v. State, 896 P.2d 558, 560 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 64 U.S.L.W.
3379 (U.S. Nov. 27, 1995) (No. 95-493) (citing Davis v. State, 763 P.2d 109, 111 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1055 (1989)).
88. Davis, 763 P.2d at 111 (citing DeVooght v. State, 722 P.2d 705 (Okla. Crim. App. 1986)
and Melvin v. State, 706 P.2d 163 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985) cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1027 (1986)).
89. The burden of proof instruction given by the trial court was as follows:
You are instructed that the burden of proof in this case is upon the State to establish by
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all the material allegations contained in the In-
formation and unless the State has met it's [sic] duty in this respect, you cannot find the
defendant guilty, but must acquit him.
Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162, 1175 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) (denying the State's petition for
rehearing) (Lumpkin, J., dissenting).
While the court does mention that the burden of proof instruction was not adequate to cure
the lack of a presumed innocent instruction, it failed to address Jury Instruction No. 3 which
read:
You are instructed that no person may be convicted of Murder in the First Degree
unless the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the crime.
These elements are:
1. The death of a human;
2. The death was unlawful;
3. The death was caused by the defendant;
4. The death was caused with malice aforethought.
Id.
Instruction No. 3 rested the burden of proof solely upon the prosecution to prove the ele-
ments of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt, and failure to do so precluded a finding of guilt.
90. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560.
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In reviewing the presumed not guilty instruction for plain or fun-
damental error, the court seemed to base its decision on rights guaran-
teed by Oklahoma statute.91 It noted that the basis for the instruction
on the presumption of innocence emanates from title 22, section 836
of the Oklahoma statutes. 92 While section 836 states the principle of
law that an accused is to be presumed innocent, it does not explicitly
require that the jury be instructed on this presumption in those ex-
press terms; rather, it seems only to require that the accused's guilt be
satisfactorily shown.93 In Cochran v. State,94 for example, the court
identified the purpose of the law on presumption of innocence is to
place the burden on the state to produce evidence and to persuade the
jury of the accused's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt before allowing
the jury to convict.95 If the burden of proof is successfully placed on
the state, failure to instruct on the presumption of innocence does not
mandate reversal.96 In fact, Oklahoma courts have held that reversal
was not warranted for failure to instruct on the presumption of inno-
cence when the jury was fully instructed on the burden of proof, the
failure to instruct was an oversight, counsel failed to object, and the
accused was not injured.97 Thus, it is clear that Oklahoma law does
91. Id. at 560-61. Whether the court based its decision on statutory or constitutional
grounds is significant because of the different applications of the harmless error doctrine.
Under the federal harmless error doctrine, automatic reversal is required for "structural
defects" that prevent the trial from being fair, these defects include an impartial trier of fact and
lack of representation by counsel. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S. Ct. 1246, 1265 (1991). "[I]f
the defendant had counsel and was tried by an impartial adjudicator, there is a strong presump-
tion that any other errors that may have occurred are subject to harmless-error analysis." Flores,
899 P.2d at 1171 (Lumpkin, J., dissenting) (quoting Rose v. Clark, 478 U.S. 570, 577 (1986)).
This test requires the prosecution to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the error did not
contribute to the verdict and includes such factors as the overwhelming evidence of guilt and
existence of cumulative evidence. See, ag., Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). See
also infra notes 108-15 and accompanying text, discussing application of the harmless error doc-
trine to a failure to give a presumption of innocence instruction.
92. Flores, 896 P.2d at 560 (citing Oa.A. STAT. tit. 22, § 836 (1991)). The presumption of
innocence "is a positive legal right appertaining to every accused person, whether guilty or inno-
cent, that he shall not be condemned for a criminal offense in a judicial trial until and unless the
evidence produced against him shall be legally sufficient to prove his guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt." Id. (quoting Miller v. State, 106 P. 538, 539 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910)).
93. See title 22, § 836. Section 836 provides that "[a] defendant in a criminal action is pre-
sumed to be innocent until the contrary is proved, and in case of a reasonable doubt as to
whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, he is entitled to be acquitted."
94. 114 P. 747 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910).
95. Flores, 896 P.2d at 561 (citing Cochran, 114 P. at 748). See also Culpepper v. State, 111
P. 679, 680-81 (Okla. Crim. App. 1910) ("[T]he 'presumption of innocence' is in truth merely
another form of the expression for a part of the accepted rule for the burden of proof in criminal
cases").
96. See Jenkins v. State, 145 P. 500, 501 (Okla. Crim. App. 1914).
97. Flores, 896 P.2d at 561 n.1 (citing Jenkins, 145 P. at 501).
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not mandate reversal for failure to instruct on presumption of
innocence.
Neither does the United States Constitution require presumption
of innocence instructions; in fact, the Flores I court noted affirmatively
that instruction on the presumption of innocence is not constitution-
ally required, but that each case must be decided on its own facts.9"
Since the court did not believe it worthwhile to even recite the facts in
Flores 1,99 it may be assumed that the decision rested on statutory
grounds. If, however, the instruction is not a constitutional right, the
defense has the burden of proving prejudice by the error before the
court will reverse.100 To meet this burden, the defense must show that
the error had a substantial influence on the outcome of the trial or the
error must leave the appellate court in "grave doubt" as to whether it
had such an effect when viewed "in relation to all else that happened
[procedurally]" during the trial. 10'
In Flores I, the court did not even discuss the facts of the case,
much less "all else that happened" during the trial, and therefore
failed to require the defense to meet this burden. 02 In fact, the court
admitted that the burden had not been met when it said "[t]he actual
impact of the instruction in the instant case on the judgment of the
jurors is difficult to determine." 0 3 For this reason, the court could
have found that the error was non-prejudicial to the defendant.
Although the Flores decision may not have rested on the United
States Constitution, the court certainly relied on Supreme Court deci-
sions in ascertaining what was meant by the term "presumption of
innocence."'0 4 The United States Supreme Court has previously ad-
dressed the issue of whether such an instruction dilutes the presump-
tion of innocence enjoyed by the defendant in a criminal case and
98. Id. at 560-61.
99. See id at 559.
100. Simpson v. State, 876 P.2d 690,701 n.14 (Okla. Crim. App. 1994) ("[Ain appellant must
first show prejudice from a non-constitutional error;, but in a constitutional error, all he need
show is the error, and prejudice is presumed .... ).
101. Id. at 702 (quoting United States v. Rivera, 900 F.2d 1462, 1469 (10th Cir. 1990) (quot-
ing Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946))). This is the harmless error test em-
ployed in Oklahoma prior to MFores L Judge Chapel, in his Flores H1 opinion, finds fault with
Judge Lumpkin's suggestion to develop a "standard" for applying the harmless error analysis to
these types of cases because he feels that the statute is clear and any attempt to define "substan-
tial" would be useless. See Flores v. State, 899 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995)
(Chapel, J., specially concurring).
102. See Mores, 896 P.2d at 559.
103. ld. at 561.
104. Se4 e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence,
although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system
1995]
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thereby diminishes the State's burden of proof to show guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt.10 5
As the Flores I court correctly notes, however, the issue is not
merely whether the instruction on the presumption of innocence must
be given, but rather the requirement that the proper burden of proof
be placed on the prosecutor.10 6 In fact, the presumption of innocence
is only one means utilized to guarantee that convictions be based on
evidence beyond a reasonable doubt.10 7 Where this important task
can be accomplished without the instruction, the instruction is not
necessary.
For example, in Taylor v. Kentucky, 08 the United States Supreme
Court reversed a conviction which was based on the failure to admin-
ister a requested presumed innocent jury instruction. 0 9 In so decid-
ing, the Court stated:
While use of the particular phrase "presumption of innocence"-or
any other form of words-may not be constitutionally mandated,
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment must be
held to safeguard "against dilution of the principle that guilt is to be
established by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt." 110
The Court, however, recognized that an instruction on the pre-
sumption of innocence has been identified as just one means of in-
structing the jury that the burden is on the prosecution to prove the
accused's guilt on the basis of the evidence and beyond a reasonable
doubt."'
of criminal justice."); Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432,453 (1895) ("The principle that there
is a presumption of innocence in favor of the accused is the undoubted law, axiomatic and ele-
mentary, and its enforcement lies at the foundation... of our criminal law.").
105. See In re Vmship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments to the United States Constitution protect individuals accused of a crime
from conviction "except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to consti-
tute the crime with which he is charged." Id. at 364.
106. "[Courts must be vigilant to avoid the dilution of the principle that guilt is to be estab-
lished by probative evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt." Flores, 896 P.2d at 561 (citing
Estelle, 425 U.S. at 503). The court further stated that "[t]he presumption of innocence is
'merely another form of expression for a part of the accepted rule for the burden of proof in
criminal cases."' Id (quoting Culpepper v. State, 114 P. 747, 748 (Okla. 1910)).
107. It is the reasonable doubt standard which "provides concrete substance for the pre-
sumption of innocence." Winship, 397 U.S. at 363.
108. 436 U.S. 478 (1978).
109. ld. at 490.
110. Id. at 485-86 (citing Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976)).
111. Id. at 486. The Supreme Court held the presumption of innocence instruction was nec-
essary in Taylor because the trial court's reasonable doubt instruction was "Spartan." Id.
[Vol. 31:349
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A year after Taylor, the Supreme Court was again faced with this
issue in Kentucky v. Whorton.112 That case arose when the Kentucky
Supreme Court interpreted Taylor to mean that a presumption of in-
nocence instruction must always be given."1  The United States
Supreme Court, however, noted that the failure to give a requested
instruction on the presumption of innocence does not in and of itself
violate the Constitution." 4 The Court stated, "[U]nder Taylor, such a
failure must be evaluated in light of the totality of the circumstances-
including all the instructions to the jury, the arguments of counsel,
whether the weight of the evidence was overwhelming, and other rele-
vant factors-to determine whether the defendant received a constitu-
tionally fair trial.""'
By identifying this "totality of the circumstances" test as the
proper device for evaluating the constitutionality of a failure to in-
struct the jury on the presumption of innocence, the Supreme Court's
reasoning suggests that a presumption of innocence instruction is not
necessary when a reasonable doubt instruction and other circum-
stances convey to the jury that the defendant is presumed innocent.
Jurors can certainly appreciate that the defendant is presumed inno-
cent from adequate reasonable doubt instructions because of the com-
plementary relationship between these two concepts." 6 Thus, if the
accused's presumption of innocence is self-evident to the jury through
the use of adequate reasonable doubt instructions, the failure to give a
proper instruction is not error."
7
Despite the authority suggesting that instructions are not re-
quired to adequately safeguard defendants' rights, the Flores I court
made a distinction between the failure to instruct on the presumption
112. 441 U.S. 786 (1979) (per curiam).
113. Id. at 788-89.
114. Id.
115. Id. at 789.
116. Se4 e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970);
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432 (1895).
117. Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979) (per curiam). The only other state to
deal with this issue has been Ohio in City of Bucyrus v. Fawley, 552 N.E.2d 676 (Ohio App.
1988). The instruction given in that case was "You must bear in mind that the Defendant is
presumed to be not guilty of the charge against him until and if the City can prove by legal and
competent evidence the guilt of the Defendant beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 677. The
appellate court found that the trial court's instruction sufficiently satisfied both Taylor and
Whorton. Id.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals felt that "[t]he Ohio court's reliance on Taylor
and Whorton is misplaced insofar as those cases address the issue of failure to give a presump-
tion of innocence instruction rather than an erroneous instruction." Flores v. State, 896 P.2d
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at all, as in Whorton, and an erroneous instruction."' Relying on
Mahorney v. Wallman,119 the court noted that "a misstatement of law
that affirmatively negates a constitutional right or principle is often...
a more serious infringement than the mere omission of a requested
instruction."'120 Such a misstatement, however, must affirmatively ne-
gate the presumption of innocence before reversal is required.12" '
The Flores I court tried to justify its conclusion that Flores' con-
stitutional rights had been "affirmatively negated" by discussing the
semantic differences between "presumed to be not guilty" and "pre-
sumed innocent."'" The court noted that words do have specific
meanings, and in the context of jury instructions, they must be used
properly."z The court also made the point that "[t]he presumption of
innocence commands the jury to start their deliberations from the
premise there exists an absence of guilt while the presumption of not
guilty conveys there exists an absence of sufficient proof of guilt." '24
Based on these arguments, the court found harmful error, even
though it recognized that "the distinction is subtle."' 25 In fact, the
court made no attempt to show that this distinction had any effect on
a particular juror or even that the jury could understand the differ-
ence. 126 It only stated that "[t]he term presumed innocent has a self-
evident meaning comprehensible to the lay juror."'127 Even if this is
true, however, it does not necessarily follow that "not guilty" has a
different self-evident meaning. The fact that the court recognizes the
118. Flores, 896 P.2d at 562.
119. 917 F.2d 469 (10th Cir. 1990).
120. Flores, 896 P.2d at 562. (quoting Mahorney, 917 F.2d at 473).
121. The Mahorney Court was able to show the presumption of innocence had been negated
because the prosecutor made improper statements to the effect that the presumption of inno-
cence only applies to those who are actually innocent. Mahorney, 917 F.2d at 471.
122. Flores, 896 P.2d at 562.
123. ld. (quoting Johnson v. State, 841 P.2d 595, 596 (Okla. Crim. App. 1992)).
124. Flores, 896 P.2d at 562. In its denial of the State's Petition for Rehearing, the court
seems to suggest that the presumed not guilty instruction denies the defendant's constitutional
right to be judged solely on the basis of evidence adduced at trial. See Flores, 899 P.2d at 1166
(Chapel, V.P.J., specially concurring). While the instruction may be one means of explaining the
accused's right, it is not necessarily the only one. In fact, the failure to give a presumption of
innocence instruction does not affect the fairness of a trial where the defendant is otherwise
afforded his right to be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt and to be judged solely on the
basis of evidence presented at trial. See Kentucky v. Whorton, 441 U.S. 786, 789 (1979).
125. Flores, 896 P.2d at 562.
126. See generally id In three of the four cases thus far retried because of reversals for
erroneous "not guilty" instructions, the defendants have been again found guilty and have re-
ceived much stiffer sentences when the jury had been instructed that they were "presumed inno-
cent." See Bill Braun, Longer Term Set In Retrial Of Tulsan, TULSA WORLD, October 8, 1995 at
Newsl9.
127. Flores, 896 P.2d at 562.
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subtle difference between the two terms128 does not explain how ju-
rors will view the terms differently. And even if the instruction dimin-
ished the effect of the instruction, it did not remove the State's burden
to prove guilt by probative evidence beyond a reasonable doubt. 29
VI. CONCLUSION
The Flores I court should not have reversed the trial court's ver-
dict absent a clearer showing of harmful or prejudicial error. The
court should have followed Judge Lumpkin's approach and applied
the harmless error doctrine using a totality of the circumstances test to
the facts in this particular case. By ruling that the "not guilty" instruc-
tion violated a substantial statutory right, the court has essentially re-
quired that each case with "not guilty" jury instructions be overturned
regardless of how harmless-in-fact such instructions may have been.
Certainly, there may have been sufficient facts to warrant a reversal in
Flores I, but the court did not examine them adequately.
In this case, the trial court instructed the jury that the burden of
proof rested solely with the prosecution and that failure to prove the
material allegations and elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt precluded a finding of guilt. As this note suggests, whether the
court wishes to reverse based on statutory or constitutional grounds, it
should base its decision on a determination of how the particular in-
struction in the particular case caused a substantial violation of the
accused's rights. It is not enough to merely declare that the instruc-
tion itself constitutes reversible error. Where the court fails to ade-
quately weigh the actual harm to the fairness of a defendant's trial, the
result is an unnecessary burden on the judicial system of this state.
Despite the need for courts to guard against dilution of the principle
that guilt is to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, where no
dilution is shown, there should be no reversible error.
Eric Pfanstiel
128. See id. ("[T]he presumption of innocence 'cautions the jury to put away from their
minds all the suspicion that arises from the arrest, the indictment, and the arraignment, and to
reach their conclusion solely from the evidence adduced."') (quoting Taylor v. Kentucky, 436
U.S. 478, 485 (1978) and 9 J. WIoMmo, EVIDENCE § 2511, p. 407 (3d ed. 1940)).
129. See supra text accompanying notes 108-17.
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